Game theoretic honeypot deployment in smart grid

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Game theoretic honeypot deployment in smart grid

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P. Diamantoulakis, C. Dalamagkas, P. Radoglou-Grammatikis, P. Sarigiannidis, G. Karagiannidis: Game theoretic honeypot deployment in smart grid. In: Sensors (Switzerland), vol. 20, no. 15, pp. 1-24, 2020.

Περίληψη

The smart grid provides advanced functionalities, including real-time monitoring, dynamic energy management, advanced pricing mechanisms, and self-healing, by enabling the two-way flow of power and data, as well as the use of Internet of Things (IoT) technologies and devices. However, converting the traditional power grids to smart grids poses severe security challenges and makes their components and services prone to cyber attacks. To this end, advanced techniques are required to mitigate the impact of the potential attacks. In this paper, we investigate the use of honeypots, which are considered to mimic the common services of the smart grid and are able to detect unauthorized accesses, collect evidence, and help hide the real devices. More specifically, the interaction of an attacker and a defender is considered, who both optimize the number of attacks and the defending system configuration, i.e., the number of real devices and honeypots, respectively, with the aim to maximize their individual payoffs. To solve this problem, game theoretic tools are used, considering an one-shot game and a repeated game with uncertainty about the payoff of the attacker, where the Nash Equilibrium (NE) and the Bayesian NE are derived, respectively. Finally, simulation results are provided, which illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed framework. © 2020 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.

Σύνδεσμοι

BibTeX (Download)

@article{Diamantoulakis20201,
title = {Game theoretic honeypot deployment in smart grid},
author = { P. Diamantoulakis and C. Dalamagkas and P. Radoglou-Grammatikis and P. Sarigiannidis and G. Karagiannidis},
url = {https://www.researchgate.net/publication/343188880_Game_Theoretic_Honeypot_Deployment_in_Smart_Grid},
doi = {10.3390/s20154199},
year  = {2020},
date = {2020-01-01},
journal = {Sensors (Switzerland)},
volume = {20},
number = {15},
pages = {1-24},
abstract = {The smart grid provides advanced functionalities, including real-time monitoring, dynamic energy management, advanced pricing mechanisms, and self-healing, by enabling the two-way flow of power and data, as well as the use of Internet of Things (IoT) technologies and devices. However, converting the traditional power grids to smart grids poses severe security challenges and makes their components and services prone to cyber attacks. To this end, advanced techniques are required to mitigate the impact of the potential attacks. In this paper, we investigate the use of honeypots, which are considered to mimic the common services of the smart grid and are able to detect unauthorized accesses, collect evidence, and help hide the real devices. More specifically, the interaction of an attacker and a defender is considered, who both optimize the number of attacks and the defending system configuration, i.e., the number of real devices and honeypots, respectively, with the aim to maximize their individual payoffs. To solve this problem, game theoretic tools are used, considering an one-shot game and a repeated game with uncertainty about the payoff of the attacker, where the Nash Equilibrium (NE) and the Bayesian NE are derived, respectively. Finally, simulation results are provided, which illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed framework. © 2020 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.},
keywords = {Cybersecurity, Game theory, Honeypots, Smart Grid},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
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